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BOOK REVIEW 

REVIEW OF NEW YORK CITY POLICE 

CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION 

COMMISSIONS, 1894-1994 

(GABRIEL J. CHIN ED., 1997) 

PAUL CHEVIGNY* 
INTRODUCTION 
The New York City Police Department ("NYPD") is one of 
the most discussed police departments in the world. At the present 
time, for example, its ambassadors, including former commissioner 
William Bratton, are deployed over the globe, explaining "quality 
of life policing," and why they believe it works. It is successful, per­
haps, because it resembles one of the oldest versions of policing, 
from which the word "police" itself derives: officials maintain an air 
of omniscience and a sense of order by pursuing every infraction 
and tolerating no deviation. Inspector Javert, in Victor Hugo's Les 
Miserables, is the ideal of "zero tolerance" policing. 
Despite the fame and occasional notoriety of the NYPD, there 
is no serious and systematic work recounting its history.! The rela­
tion of "quality of life policing," for example, to earlier practices in 
New York City, as well as other cities, remains a matter of anecdote 
and sporadic, although sometimes brilliant, journalism. In this re­
spect, history is not very different for New York City than it is for 
other cities. Until the last generation, police work in the United 
States nearly passed under the academic radar. This was partly a 
result of the fact that police in this country have mostly been organ­
ized at the municipal level and have always dealt chiefly with the 
poor. The history of the police was, until recently, viewed as local, 
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. LL.B., 1960, Harvard 
University School of Law; B.A., 1957, Yale University. 
1. The best written history on the early period is JAMES F. RICHARDSON, THE 
NEW YORK POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1901 (1970). Conversely, GERALD ASTOR, 
THE NEW YORK CoPs: AN INFORMAL HISTORY (1971), is exactly what it purports to be. 
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repetitive, and low-class.2 
The material that we have for the history of the police in our 
cities is largely the chronicles of misdeeds, either those curbed by 
the police or those committed by the police themselves. Such 
chronicles have been preserved in some memoirs, but more in 
newspaper accounts either about celebrated crimes or municipal 
scandals, which have led to official reports such as those collected 
by Gabriel Chin in New York City Police Corruption Investigation 
Commissions, 1894-1994.3 Yet these misdeeds have been a motor 
of change in police departments, as well as in municipalities gener­
ally. So, the reports that Chin has collected are a good part of the 
skeleton of the history of the NYPD. In his introduction to the 
volumes, Chin notes the weary saying of New Yorkers that for the 
past century there has been a big police scandal "every twenty years 
or SO."4 These six volumes constitute the final reports for the most 
notable of those scandals, which actually occurred more frequently 
than every twenty years.s The first report, in 1894, was a legislative 
inquiry headed by State Senator Clarence Lexow, triggered by a 
series of investigations by private reformers, with resulting newspa­
per stories detailing vice and corruption in the city. The second, led 
by city Alderman Henry Curran, was prompted by the 1912 murder 
of gambler Herman Rosenthal, masterminded (or so it was thought 
at the time) by NYPD Lieutenant Charles Becker. Seventeen years 
later, Governor Franklin Roosevelt requested the judiciary to look 
into corruption in the city's courts. Judge Samuel Seabury pub­
lished the results of his investigation in 1932, when scandal about 
corruption and brutality in law enforcement was rising nationally as 
well.6 In 1949, following a newspaper scandal about corrupt pay­
2. An excellent study of Los Angeles city police, Joseph Gerald Woods, The 
Progressives and the Police: Urban Reform and the Professionalization of the Los An­
geles Police (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Los An­
geles», has unfortunately never been published. 
3. The series of reports collected by Professor Chin appear in a six volume work, 
with each volume containing a specific report. In addition, Professor Chin has added a 
brief introduction to each report, as well as a series introduction contained within vol­
ume I. Each of the six volumes will be referred to within this Book Review by either 
the name of its accompanying report or introduction. See generally 1 NEW YORK CITY 
POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONS, 1894-1994 (Gabriel J. Chin ed. 
1997) [hereinafter SERIES INTRODUCTION or LEXOW REpORT]; 2 id. [hereinafter CUR. 
RAN REPORT]; 3 id. [hereinafter SEABURY REpORT]; 4 id. [hereinafter HELFAND RE· 
PORT]; 5 id. [hereinafter KNAPP REpORT]; 6 id. [hereinafter MOLLEN REpORT). 
4. SERIES INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at ix. 
5. As noted by Chin, there have also been other scandals and other reports. See 
id. at viii-ix. 
6. The first national report on abuses in law enforcement appeared in 1931 and 
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ments from gamblers, Brooklyn prosecutor Julius Helfand under­
took not only to report, but to prosecute the crimes. In 1972, 
prompted again by newspaper stories of corruption, many of which 
emanated from two police officers whose names have become leg­
end, Frank Serpico and David Durk, a citizens' commission led by 
Whitman Knapp, at the request of Mayor John Lindsay, reported 
the results of its investigation. Finally, in 1994, after a spectacularly 
embarrassing arrest of New York City police brazenly selling drugs 
on Long Island, a commission requested by Mayor David Dinkins 
and led by former judge Milton Mollen reported on corruption and 
brutality in several city precincts. Despite the fact that Professor 
Chin has edited these reports in six small volumes, reading them is 
not an intimidating project; the longest report (Knapp) is 264 pages, 
while the shortest (Curran) is 39 pages (without appendices). 
I read the Knapp and Mollen Commission Reports when they 
came out (so old am I in the pursuit of these scandals), and I looked 
at some of the others in my own work. But I had no conception of 
how interesting it would be to read them all in succession. Collec­
tively, the reports give us an idea as to how political scandal and 
reform are produced in our society. The press is the great engine 
for creating pressure in these cases, forcing political leaders to take 
some action, however minimal. In the case of most of these investi­
gations, leaders had something to lose by undertaking them. Judge 
Samuel Seabury, under the aegis of the governor and the appellate 
courts, had the greatest freedom and the greatest results. Clarence 
Lexow, a legislator, was opposed by the governor; it is illuminating 
to read the 1894 message of the governor vetoing the budget for the 
investigation, saying that it was "a misuse of public money ... for 
the manufacture of political capital or the division of political pa­
tronage."7 The legislators were obliged to raise funds from private 
sources to complete the project. The report was such a bombshell 
that no one has had the temerity to berate subsequent investiga­
tions in such bold terms. 
Yet, surely Mayor Lindsay (Knapp) and Mayor Dinkins (Mol­
len) had reason to be apprehensive about the scandals in their ad­
ministrations. They may have expressed their fears through budget 
limitations; both the Knapp and Mollen Commissions had some pri­
discussed such scandal. See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE 
AND ENFORCEMENT ("WICKERSHAM COMMISSION"), REpORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT (1931). 
7. LEXOW REpORT, supra note 3, at 10. 
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vate support supplementing the public outlays. However reluctant 
the mayors may have been, they had little choice but to authorize 
the commissions. The storms of scandal were so overwhelming that 
officials looked less guilty by joining the investigation than by fight­
ing it. The mayors also were, no doubt, men of good faith; they 
genuinely sought to understand the problem rather than avoid it. 
They did not indulge in a cynical dodge, as Mayor Giuliani did after 
the Louima torture scandal in 1997, appointing a powerless body 
and then condemning its conc1usions.8 All in all, the original publi­
cation of these six reports is a great credit to a free press and parti­
san politics. 
Although their embodiment of the political dynamics that pro­
duce scandal and reform would be enough to make these reports 
interesting, in fact, they have broader significance. They are of his­
torical significance in at least two ways. While it is true that some 
of the problems, especially corruption due to "vice" crimes, are re­
peated in the successive reports, they also record changes in New 
York City, its politics, and its police. The reports suggest what the 
social causes were and are that perpetuate the problems, as well as 
the sources of change. These may be social-the shift to narcotics 
as a source of corruption, for example-or they may be quite delib­
erate-the instruments of institutional reform. 
I. ETERNAL CORRUPTION? 
All of the investigations before the most recent Mollen Report 
of 1994 reveal police corruption in enforcing laws against gambling 
and prostitution. In 1972, the Knapp Commission noted corruption 
in narcotics enforcement, and by 1994, narcotics graft had com­
pletely overshadowed the others.9 
Commentators on urban history in the United States have re­
marked that the persistent corruption in the enforcement of "vice" 
crimes is a reflection of the puritanism and hypocrisy that runs 
through our law, particularly during periods of reform.1O Legisla­
8. See generally MICHAEL MEYERS ET AL., DEFLEcnNG BLAME: THE DISSENT­
ING REpORT OF THE MAYOR's TASK FORCE ON POLICE/COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
(1998). 
9. Compare KNAPP REPORT, supra note 3, at 91-115 (briefly analyzing the prob­
lem of police corruption in narcotics enforcement), with MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 
3, at 16-17 (recognizing that the nature of police corruption has changed, with corrup­
tion in narcotics enforcement now representing a significant portion of the corruption 
problem). 
10. See PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERI­
CAS 117-44 (1995); ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 108-111 (1977). 
237 1999] NEW YORK CITY POLICE CORRUPTION 
tors could not vote against a law that condemned vice. However, in 
practice few cared to control it, except perhaps in the case of nar­
cotics, which presents more serious problems of control, as well as 
greater monetary temptations. The result has been that purveyors 
of vice have paid off officials for protection from the laws. As this 
is written, in 1998, we are in the midst of a scandal, relatively minor 
compared to the six in the volumes under review, in which New 
York City police received sexual payoffs in return for protecting 
brothels in midtown Manhattan.!1 Despite the hypocrisy and cor­
ruption, vice laws have continued on the books. Reading these six 
reports together with Professor Chin's introduction, it is difficult to 
escape the sense that ambitious reformers needed the vice laws, and 
the scandals they generated, to justify their work. Professor Chin 
recites the list of investigators, prosecutors, and commissioners who 
built their reputations through these six investigations, attaining ju­
dicial posts and higher office.12 
Officials, not just in New York City, but in other cities, even 
when they had no interest in reform, still needed the vice laws for 
the corrupt revenue they produced. A Los Angeles politician, Wil­
bur LeGette, long ago opined that "[t]he purpose of any political 
organization is to get the money from the gamblers."13 It is inter­
esting to note that as vice enforcement against gambling has faded, 
the government has started to run its own lotteries. Corruption was 
so general in New York City that the police took bribes from a wide 
range of businesses outside the illegal vice rackets. Almost any 
trade that was tightly regulated, as many were and still are in New 
York City, was fair game for graft in return for overlooking minor 
violations. The Knapp Commission reported that police were tak­
ing payoffs from bars,14 and the Curran and Lexow Commissions, 
much earlier, said that police took bribes to overlook evasion of 
taxes on liquor.15 An interesting example is the tow-truck business, 
a natural for graft because on most occasions when tow-trucks ar­
rived at the scene of an accident, the police were already in control 
of the situation. Since the business was highly competitive, there 
was a strong temptation for tow-truck operators to payoff the po­
11. Dan Barry, Police Used Brothel So Often, Madam Got Worried, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 18, 1991, at AI. 
12. See SERIES INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at xiii-xvi. 
13. Woods, supra note 2, at 315. 
14. See KNAPP REpORT, supra note 3, at 2. 
15. See CURRAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 15; LEXOW REpORT, supra note 3, at 
19,39-40. 
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lice for the privilege of being the first at the scene. Both the Hel­
fand and Knapp Reports, nearly twenty years apart, record this 
enduring racket.16 
The most interesting aspect of official graft in businesses that 
were not condemned outright as forms of vice is that it had the 
effect of drawing gangsters into the businesses. For example, years 
ago, many night clubs in New York City had a reputation for being 
run by "shady characters." This stemmed, in part, from the fact 
that the night club business was so highly regulated that it was al­
most impossible to run a club in a completely lawful manner. The 
business thus attracted people who knew how to cut corners and 
pay protection.17 Police graft tended to turn legitimate businesses 
into rackets. 
Some of the sources of graft thinned out as the hypocrisy about 
vice weakened over time. The Knapp Commission, in a move char­
acteristic of the 1970s, recommended the legalization of gambling 
and an end to Sabbath closing laws, which were an additional 
source of payoffs.18 The Knapp Report was also cautiously critical 
of the way prostitution and narcotics laws were enforced.19 
Although gambling is now not strictly legal in New York, enforce­
ment at the local level has largely disappeared. Corruption due to 
drugs, however, has grown apace. 
Any reader of these six reports must ask the question whether 
the problem of corruption in the police is inevitable, and whether 
the labor on the periodic reports, therefore, has been largely in vain 
as an instrument of reform. The problem of tow-truck graft, after 
all, was reported in investigations eighteen years apart.20 Upon 
analysis, these reports, for the most part, cannot answer that ques­
tion because of the limitations in their conception of the problem. 
II. THE NARROW Focus OF THE REPORTS 
Evidence of the distortion created by the methods used in 
these reports can be found by looking at the connection between 
corruption and brutality. In 1994, the Mollen Commission made a 
16. See HELFAND REpORT, supra note 3, at 94-95; KNAPP REpORT, supra note 3, 
at 158-62. 
17. See generally PAUL CHEVIGNY, GIGS: JAZZ AND THE CABARET LAWS IN NEW 
YORK CITY (1991). 
18. See KNAPP REpORT, supra note 3, at 90, lSI. 
19. See id. at 19. 
20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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point of describing the link between brutality and corruption;21 one 
hundred years earlier, the Lexow Commission saw the connection 
in "that the police formed a separate and highly privileged class, 
armed with the authority and the machinery for oppression and 
punishment, but practically free themselves from the operation of 
the criminallaw."22 The implication is that both in the case of cor­
ruption and of physical abuse, the police set themselves up as an 
authority independent of the rest of the justice system, with the 
powers to decide who shall be punished, in what way, and for what 
offense. Moreover, when this extra-legal system is accepted by pa­
trol officers and superiors, it creates a parallel system of impunity, 
in which everyone is implicated, and no one can effectively report 
unlawful acts. Thus, one problem feeds the other. 
The four reports between the Lexow and Mollen Reports 
missed the connection because they concentrated on "police cor­
ruption" in a narrow sense, without its larger implications. Chief 
Counsel Michael Armstrong implied as much in his foreword to the 
Knapp Report. The reports may have failed to find better solutions 
to the problem of "police corruption" because they focused too nar­
rowly on the problem in isolation and because their proposals for 
reform were thus restricted by that narrow focus, as well as by the 
way the investigations were conducted. 
Many of the reports limited their recommendations to reforms 
within the police as a route to greater honesty, a course which has 
not been fruitful.23 The Lexow Report, for example, recommended 
that the direct management of the NYPD be removed from the par­
tisan commission that was then nominally in control of it and, in­
stead, be concentrated in the hands of a chief of police.24 
After executive power was actually centralized in a single com­
missioner, eleven years later, the Curran Report blamed most of 
the problems on poor management by the commissioner individu­
ally and demanded that he be replaced (which was not done).25 By 
this time, the defects in the oversight of police conducted by the 
police themselves should have been tolerably clear. The Curran 
Commission reported that complaints of corruption were simply re­
ferred to the officer complained of for his comments; the commis­
21. See MOLLEN REpORT, supra note 3, at 44-50. 
22. LEXOW REpORT, supra note 3, at 31. 
23. The Mollen Report, discussed infra this Part, is an exception, and the Seabury 
Report, which is in a class by itself, is discussed infra Part III. 
24. See LEXOW REpORT, supra note 3, at 59. 
25. See CURRAN REpORT, supra note 3, at 3. 
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sion recommended that "[a] small secret service squad, composed 
of men other than policemen, should be employed by the Commis­
sioner to secure evidence against corrupt police officials."26 In 
eighty-five years, that recommendation has never been imple­
mented. The Knapp Commission recommended that there be com­
mand responsibility on the part of superiors for the actions of 
officers and that the Internal Affairs Division, which investigates 
corruption within the NYPD, be reorganized.27 This was done, and 
yet the Mollen Commission, twenty years later, reported very simi­
lar problems in the internal investigations of corruption,28 which 
was (and still is) viewed by superior officers as an embarrassing 
problem that they would prefer not to think or talk about. Corrup­
tion investigators get no thanks for doing a thorough job and senior 
officers, when they cannot avoid the problem, tend to "solve" it by 
making isolated arrests that may obstruct access to a larger network 
of corruption. 
Sometimes, the reports have recommended systematic changes 
that are promising. The Knapp Commission advocated lateral en­
try to the supervisory ranks,29 which would have tended to break 
down the old-boy secrecy in the NYPD. This has never been done. 
The Mollen Commission recommended the more basic reform of 
using an outside investigative body to monitor police corruption in 
the NYPD.30 The history of the recurring malaise in internal inves­
tigations makes clear that this is a minimal reform, yet as of this 
writing Mayor Giuliani has bitterly resisted any such proposals. 
A further limitation on the effectiveness of the reports is that 
most of them have focused on the punishment of individuals for 
violating the laws against corruption. Such a punishment perspec­
tive has often disabled the report from taking a larger view of re­
form. Thus, the Knapp Commission wrote proudly of the numbers 
of indictments that had issued from its work and offered as a princi­
pal recommendation the appointment of a state special prosecutor 
for corruption.31 The worst offender in this respect is the Helfand 
Report, which discussed nothing but scandal about gambling cor­
ruption, and seemed to recommend almost nothing but more vigor­
ous enforcement of the criminal laws, including the gambling 
26. [d. at 6. 
27. See KNAPP REpORT, supra note 3, at 13-16. 
28. See MOLLEN REpORT, supra note 3, at 70-109. 
29. See KNAPP REPORT, supra note 3, at 32. 
30. See MOLLEN REpORT, supra note 3, at 148-58. 
31. See KNAPP REpORT, supra note 3, at 260-64. 
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laws.32 While the prosecution of corrupt officials was necessary, of 
course, it could not be the principal way of reducing police abuse, 
which would have to come through institutional changes and re­
duced temptations. 
The concentration on the punishment of individuals has some­
times effectively limited the focus of reports because the reports 
cannot reach beyond those, few or many, against whom investiga­
tors are able to obtain evidence. Thus, the Knapp Commission spe­
cifically stated that it was "unable to develop hard evidence" 
against anyone above the rank of lieutenant and that it had no re­
sources to investigate officials outside the police department.33 
Similarly, the Mollen Commission was cautious in saying that its 
mandate was limited to the police and that it could not determine 
the full scope of corruption and brutality even inside the NYPD.34 
While this caution is understandable within the framework of the 
investigations-as we would not like to see these bodies make accu­
sations against individuals without evidence-that framework has 
created the impression that we are dealing with a problem that is 
specific to the police, and perhaps especially to the rank-and-file. 
Given the pervasiveness of corruption at the time of the Knapp in­
vestigation, in retrospect, it seems unlikely that money was not be­
ing paid, perhaps through the police, to other sorts of officials, and 
it is very difficult to believe that high ranking police officials were 
not involved. If there were no such wider connections, in the de­
partment and the larger society, the persistence of massive corrup­
tion would be nearly incomprehensible. 
The punishment perspective, moreover, has led to side-effects 
of doubtful desirability. Some individuals were scapegoated, as 
Professor Chin points out in his introduction.35 Resistance within 
the NYPD to the scandal investigations was so intense that the 
background of witnesses was commonly raked over until the police 
and local prosecutors could find something with which to charge 
someone in the effort to taint the investigation. There may be no 
"frame-up;" the charge may be literally true, but of the sort that 
would not have been discovered, or if discovered, would not have 
been prosecuted without the investigation. Thus, witnesses for 
32. See generally HELFAND REpORT, supra note 3. 
33. See KNAPP REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. 
34. See MOLLEN REpORT, supra note 3, at 9. 
35. See SERIES INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at xxiv. 
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these reports have been charged with everything from perjury to 
murder. 
Both the Knapp and Mollen Commissions succeeded in their 
investigations by turning officers against one another-by catching 
an officer in a corrupt act and getting him to collect evidence in 
return for leniency in prosecution. Although this practice is proba­
bly unavoidable in the United States' system of prosecution, it is 
certainly odious and it is not something that we should happily look 
forward to as an instrument for controlling law enforcement abuses. 
While such practices may have to be used in the short run and in 
the individual case, the creation of suspicion and distrust cannot be 
the best way to root out corruption. We look forward to a situation 
where police officers not only do not expect to take graft, but where 
society as a whole does not expect to take or offer graft as well. 
This may seem a naive hope, but some of the experiences in these 
investigations, notably in the Seabury Report, suggest that it is not 
utterly utopian. 
III.. SYSTEMIC CHANGE AND THE SIX INVESTIGATIONS 
The Lexow Commission's proposal that the department be 
managed by a single official was adopted, for better or for worse, 
and still prevails today. At present, the police commissioner an­
swers to the mayor, and the two systematically resist any intrusion 
by other political forces. 
A major change has been the minimization of outside political 
interference in the appointment and promotion of police officers. 
The Lexow and Curran Reports both criticized political interfer­
ence and payoffs in personnel decisions, and the Lexow Commis­
sion recommended a better civil service.36 The Curran Report also 
noted the poor pay of police officers and the poor quality of re­
cruits.37 These are problems that have largely passed away; police 
are recruited, protected, and decently paid through civil service 
standards. The greatest change is one that affects much more than 
the police and is, by this time, invisible to the average citizen, as 
well as to the average lawyer: the transformation of the criminal 
justice system, at its lower levels, from a racket to a system which, 
whatever its defects, can at least be viewed and criticized as an at­
tempt at a system of justice. Through all six of the reports there are 
36. See LEXOW REpORT, supra note 3, at 47-51; CURRAN REpORT, supra note 3, 
at 29-32. 
37. See CURRAN REpORT, supra note 3, at 23-29. 
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accounts of frame-ups or false charges. In later reports we read, for 
example, of "flaking" people by planting narcotics to justify an 
arrest38 or using other devices to make a charge stick or to meet a 
quota.39 But in the earlier accounts, such practices amount to a sys­
tem of oppression. The Lexow Commission reported that the po­
lice brought charges against people, especially those least able to 
defend themselves, solely for the purpose of extorting money in ex­
change for having the charges dismissed. The commission charged 
"the existence of a powerful conspiracy in the neighborhood of Es­
sex Market police court (on the Lower East Side-PGC), headed by 
politicians, including criminals, professional thieves, police and 
others who lay plots against the unwary ...."40 This system, or one 
like it, persisted for decades. The Curran Commission reported 
that detectives staged crimes in order to shake down the victims for 
the return of their goods, and that police witnesses could be in­
duced to "throw a case" for a price.41 
The Seabury investigation addressed precisely the problem of 
the lower criminal courts being run as an extortion racket by the 
magistrates, lawyers, bondsmen, and police. Here is how the game 
worked. An ordinary person was arrested for a low-level crime. 
For example, a respectable woman was charged by the police vice 
squad with prostitution. The police then refused to permit her to 
make a telephone call until she made an arrangement with one of 
their selected bail bondsmen. In return for most of her assets, the 
bondsman got her released and offered to "fix" the case for her, 
warning her that if she tried to defend the case any other way she 
would be convicted. She was tried, defended by a lawyer she had 
never seen before, and, if the fix was in, she was acquitted. Every­
one was paid off, including the prosecutor.42 
Samuel Seabury, as a judge appointed by the judiciary at the 
request of the governor, was not limited by local politics to looking 
into "police corruption" or any other separate part of the problem; 
he was supposed to solve the problem as a whole if he could. In his 
report, Seabury discussed the police only in passing, along with 
magistrates, lawyers, clerks, and bondsmen. Seabury did not rec­
ommend any reforms in the police as such; he merely recom­
38. See KNAPP REpORT, supra note 3, at 28. 
39. See SERIES INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at xvii-xxi. 
40. LEXOW REpORT, supra note 3, at 43. 
41. See CURRAN REpORT, supra note 3, at 8, 16. 
42. See SEABURY REpORT, supra note 3, at 21-24. 
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mended that arraignments never be held in station-houses.43 He 
recommended that the magistrates' court be abolished and replaced 
by a centralized criminal court and that the bail system be reformed 
to permit parole release for some defendants and cash bond release 
for many others in non-serious cases.44 He also recommended that 
the assistance of the lawyers who "hang around the courtrooms"45 
be replaced by Legal Aid and a panel of lawyers selected by the 
appellate courts.46 All of these reforms were implemented, while at 
the same time the old, slack type of district attorney was being re­
placed by ambitious incorruptibles like Thomas Dewy and Frank 
Hogan.47 The result has been that criminal court as an extortion 
racket has utterly disappeared and with it a large source of corrup­
tion of all sorts, including police corruption. In the daily work of 
the lower courts, with a few exceptions, no one expects graft, and 
no one offers it-the utopia I mentioned a few pages back. 
The Seabury investigation is an object lesson in institutional 
reform. The best of blue-ribbon commissions cannot solve 
problems unless they are given the power to solve them. Seabury 
had a very broad mandate and the backing of the governor and the 
appellate judiciary, none of whom were interested in preserving the 
status quo in the criminal justice system. Other commissions have 
not had such a broad mandate or such uncompromising support. 
Investigations which concentrate on "police corruption" to the ex­
clusion of other problems may expose some problems and may 
bring some criminals to justice. However, the work is very likely to 
be repeated, especially if the investigations concentrate on the sins 
of individual police officers, and even more so if the investigations 
are limited to exposing the sins of low-level police officers. 
Viewed as an isolated problem, police corruption and its at­
tendant abuses can perhaps best be controlled by an oversight body 
independent of the police, as the Mollen Commission recom­
mended.48 But the history of these six investigations tells us that we 
ought to stop looking at police corruption as an isolated problem 
and see it as one that reaches to other officials and to the larger 
society. 
43. See id. at 202. 
44. See id. at 164, 182, 202. 
45. Id. at 217. 
46. See id. at 220-21. 
47. See generally Lawrence Fleischer, Thomas E. Dewey and Earl Warren: The 
Rise of the Twentieth-Century Urban Prosecutor, 28 CAL. W. L. REv. 1 (1991). 
48. See MOLLEN REpORT, supra note 3, at 148-58. 
